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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARINDA DAY, 
Plaintif !-Appellant 
vs. 
LORENZO SMITH & SON, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case No. 
10256 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Lorenzo Smith & Son, hereinafter referred to as "de-
fendant" does not adopt the Statement of Facts set forth 
in the brief of Marinda Day, hereinafter ref erred to as the 
"plaintiff". The Jury answered five questions in a special 
verdict resulting in a judgment in favor of the defendant, 
no cause of action. 
In view of the jury verdict and judgment, wherever 
the evidence is in conflict, it must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the defendant. Rivas v. Pacific Finance 
Co.,_ Utah 2d _, 397 P. 2d 990 (1964), Hales v. Peterson, 
11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822 (1961). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the morning of September 11, 1961, plaintiff was 
riding as a passenger in a 1949 Chevrolet Sedan modified 
into a pickup truck enroute from Fillmore to Provo, Utah, 
on U.S. Highway 91. (R 215) The truck was driven by 
plaintiff's friend, Larry Roberts, who was 16 years of age. 
(R 214) It was a clear fall morning and the roads were dry. 
(R 138) Roberts was driving at approximately 50 to 60 miles 
per hour. (R 216, 382) Juab County Sheriff Ray Jackson 
was also proceeding North on U.S. Highway 91 in a patrol 
car about one half mile in back of the Roberts truck. (R 139) 
At approximately 10 :30 A.M. Roberts approached an area 
where other vehicles were parked along the highway about 
4.3 miles north of Nephi, Utah. There was a Ford station 
wagon parked on the East shoulder of the highway facing 
North. (Exh P-1) A Utah highway patrol car was parked 
off the highway on the east side facing north. (R 140) 
The two rear stop lights on the patrol car were flashing 
on and off. (R 180) A foreign car was parked on the west 
shoulder of the highway facing north. (Exh D-4) There 
were other vehicles on the West side of the highway facing 
South. (R 175, Exh P-1 and P-3) Utah Highway patrolman 
Eldon Sherwood was on the West shoulder of the highway. 
(R 177) Sherwood was standing at the rear of the foreign 
car talking to a Mrs. Naismith. (R 176, 211) He was com· 
pleting an investigation of a one car accident involving a 
roll over of the foreign car. (R 174) Mr. Henry Kelly, his 
son Robert, the occupants of the Ford Station wagon; Mr. 
Desmond Naismith, Helen Naismith, the occupants of the 
foreign car, and others were at the scene of the roll over 
of the foreign car. (R 176) When Roberts approached the 
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scene of the accident involving the foreign car, his speed 
was not noticably diminished. (R 338) Roberts speed was 
estimated at 45 to 60 miles per hour as he drove into the 
area where the other cars were stopped. (R 339, 382) As 
they cazne into the area, Roberts made a "slight turn" to 
the left to go out around the patrolman's car. (R 256) 
While Roberts was approaching the accident scene, 
Joseph Ivy Mitchell, an employee of the defendant, was 
driving defendant's 1961 Corvair box truck (Greenbriar) 
South on U.S. Highway 91. (R 143) Mitchell drove through 
the accident area "very slowly". (R 213) Helen Naismith 
estimated his speed at 5 miles per hour. (R 213) As Mitch-
ell proceeded South and Roberts proceeded North through 
the scene of the first accident, the vehicles sideswiped each 
other. (R 338) The impact between the two vehicles oc-
curred South of the foreign (Naismith) car. (R 204, 346) 
The noise of the impact was to the right rear of Sherwood 
who turned immediately and saw the Roberts truck "take 
off" obliquely down the east side of the highway, travel 
some distance, turn sideways, skid and roll over one com-
plete turn. (R 177, 178) The Roberts vehicle came to rest 
310 feet down the highway from the point where the two 
vehicles came together. (R 178) Mitchell drove defendant's 
vehicle off on the west side of the highway about 150 feet 
from the point of impact. (R 178) Sherwood got in his 
patrol car and drove down the highway to the Roberts 
truck. (R 184) Plaintiff had been thrown out of the truck 
at the time it had rolled over. (R 327) Sherwood invest-
igated the accident between the Roberts truck and defend-
ant's Corvair Greenbriar. (R 174) In his investigation 
Sherwood examined the debris on the highway, (R 182) 
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the skid marks left by the Roberts truck, (R 179) the ; 
damage to the two vehicles (R 184, 185) and he talked to 
the drivers of the two vehicles. (R 181, 188) Sherwood 
determined from his investigation that the impact between 
the two vehicles occurred on the West (defendant's) side 
of the highway. (R 184) Sherwood's examination of the 
Roberts truck disclosed the brake pedal could be pushed 
to the floor without any brake action. (R 184) 
There was a conflict in the testimony as to whether the 
point of impact was on the west or east side of the high-
way. The plaintiff and her driver, Larry Roberts, testified 
the impact was on the east (plaintiff's) side. (R 233, 218) 
Henry Kelly and his son Robert Kelly testified the impact 
occurred on the west (defendant's) side. (R 339, 384) Des-
mond Naismith and Marion Brown testified the impact oc-
curred on the east (plaintiff's) side. (R 194, 322) Sherwood, 
the investigating officer, determined the impact was on the 
west (defendant's) side of the highway. (R 184) Sheriff 
Jackson, who came on the scene of the accident shortly 
after it occurred, testified he couldn't tell where the point 
of impact was. (R 145) 
The case was submitted to the jury in a special verdict. 
On the basis of the answers given by the jury, the court 
entered a judgment of no cause of action. (R 420) 
The only point raised on appeal is that the trial court 
erred in permitting the highway patrolman to give his 
opinion as to the point of impact. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED 
THE HIGHWAY PATROLMAN TO TESTIFY 
AS TO THE POINT OF IMPACT. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PER-
MITTED THE PATROLMAN TO BE CROSS 
EXAMINED ON THE POINT OF IMP ACT 
AFTER PLAINTIFF OPENED THE INQUIRY 
ON DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Plaintiff called highway patrolman Eldon C. Sherwood 
as her own witness. (R 174) Sherwood testified he had 24 
years experience in investigating accidents. (R 174) D~ 
fendant stipulated that patrolman Sherwood was an expert 
in the matter of accident investigation. (R 174) Plaintiff's 
attorney opened the subject of point of collision in his direct 
examination of officer Sherwood. 
Q. (Mr. Beesley) I see. Now, were there any 
objective signs whatsoe1,er to determine the point 
of collision? (Italics ours) 
A. No. 
MR. NEBEKER: I will object to that, Your 
Honor. I think he can state what he saw and let 
the jury decide. 
THE COURT: Well, since he says no, I guess 
we don't have to pursue it further. 
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Mr. Beesley: I don't intend to, Your Honor. 
(R 181) 
The inference raised by this question and answer was that 
the patrolman could not determine the point of impact. On 
Cross examination defendant's counsel asked Sherwood if 
he had examined the road where the two vehicles collided, 
if he found debris on the road and if he determined the 
point of impact to which he answered "yes". Plaintiff's 
counsel objected to any "opinion" from the patrolman. 
Q. (Mr. Nebeker) I see. Now, you did examine 
the roadway where these two vehicles had collided, 
did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you found that there was considerable 
debris on the road there, did you not? 
A. Well, I wouldn't know about the consider-
able amount, but there was debris. 
Q. From your examination of the road, you 
made a determination as to the approximate point of 
impact, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that point of impact on the east or the 
west side of the road? 
A. It was near the center line, and my best 
opinion, it may have been-
MR. BEESLEY: I will object to any opinion, 
Your Honor. 
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THE COURT. Well, you may give your judg-
ment. If you are giving us an opinion, he would be 
right. If you mean by your opinion your best judg-
ment as to what you judge it would be, I think you 
might proceed, Sergeant, and I don't quite know-
Q. Give us your judgment. 
MR. BEESLEY: Make the same objection, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let's find out if he has a judg-
ment or giving an opinion. If he is giving an opinion, 
he can't. 
Q. Do you have a judgment as to where the 
point of impact occurred? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Will you tell us what that judgment is? 
MR. BEESLEY: Objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: It's overruled. He may give his 
judgment. 
A. As near the center line and probably a 
little bit west. 
MR. BEESLEY: I object to any probability, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: If you are confining it to your 
judgment-
Q. Just give us your best judgment. 
THE COURT: You can tell us your judgment. 
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MR. BEESLEY: I believe he said the center 
line. 
A. Near the center line. 
Q. Was it on the west or the east of the center 
line? 
A. Do I have to answer that "Yes" or "No"? 
Q. Yes. 
A. My opinion is no good? 
Q. Just give us your judgment. 
THE COURT: You can give your judgment, 
Sergeant. 
A. My judgment, slightly to the west of the 
center line. 
Q. Would you say it was about a foot to the 
west of the center line? 
A. I think that would be a fair figure. 
Q. It could have been a little further west? 
It could have been a little further east? 
A. Yes. (R 182, 183, 184) 
The trial court, in directing defendant's counsel to find out 
if the patrolman had a "judgment" as to the point of im-
pact rather than an "opinion", was apparently attempting 
to determine if the patrolman's testimony was based on his 
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personal observation and investigation of the accident scene 
or whether his testimony arose from a belief or impression 
obtained from some other source. 
The plaintiff's attorney did not object to the patrol-
man's opinion on the ground it was not proper cross exam-
ination. He obviously could not object on that ground be-
cause he had opened the inquiry in his direct examination 
by asking the patrolman if there were any "objective signs" 
whatsoever to determine the point of impact which was 
answered "no". 
Q. I see. Now, were there any objective signs 
whatsoever to determine the point of collision? 
A. No. (R 181) 
In view of the negative inference created by the attorney 
for the plaintiff on direct examination, defendant's at-
torney was entitled to cross examine the patrolman as to 
whether or not there were "objective signs" on the high-
way to determine the point of collision, and if so, where it 
was. Plaintiff should not be permitted to raise a negative 
inference on direct examination and then object to cross 
examination on the same subject. 
It is axiomatic that a witness may be cross examined 
as to his direct testimony and as to whatever goes to ex-
plain, modify or discredit what he has stated on direct 
examination. 58 Am. Jur. Witnesses Sec. 610 
"Character and Purpose. The cross-examina-
tion of witnesses is one of the safeguards to accuracy 
and truthfulness. The test of cross-examination is 
the highest and the most indispensable known to the 
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law for the discovery of truth. When a witness has 
been examined in chief, the other party has the right 
to cross-examine for the purpose of ascertaining and 
exhibiting the situation of the witness with respect 
to the parties and to the subject of the litigation, his 
interest, his motive, his inclinations, his prejudices, 
his means of obtaining a correct and certain know]. 
edge of the facts to which he has borne testimony, 
the manner in which he has used those means, and 
his powers of discernment, memory and description. 
The purpose of the cross-examination is to test the 
truthfulness of the witness, to sift, modify, or 
explain what has been said, to develop new or old 
facts in a view favorable to the cross-examiner, or 
to discredit the witness, and, if he is the plaintiff, to 
test his good faith-the righteousness of his case." 
(Italics ours) 
The adversary system of justice is predicated on the 
fundamental right of cross examination. In State v. Zolan-
Takis, 70 Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044 (1927) this Court stated 
that in a judicial investigation the right of cross examina-
tion is an absolute right and not a mere privilege of the 
party against whom the witness is called. It is only after 
such right has been substantiated and fairly exercised that 
the allowance of further cross examination will be discre-
tionary. This Court has previously held that cross examina-
tion should never be curtailed or limited so long as it tends 
to disclose the truth. State v. Peck, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 
2d 630 (1953). 
-
If there ever was any valid objection to Sherwood's 
testimony regarding point of impact, plaintiff's attorney 
waived his objection by opening the matter on direct ex-
amination. 
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In Wollan v. Billett, 375 P. 2d 146 (Wash. 1962) the 
Supreme Court of Washington held that defendant's at-
torney had waived his objection to an opinion given by a 
witness as to point of impact, when he had opened the in-
quiry as to the point of impact on cross examination. The 
Court stated : 
"A member of the traffic division of the Tacoma 
police department was called as a witness for the 
respondents. On cross examination, appellant's 
counsel inquired if the witness could fix the point of 
impact, to which he replied "Not exactly, no, sir." 
Thereafter, on redirect examination, he did express 
his opinion on the point in question, to which the 
appellant's counsel objected on the ground that the 
witness was not qualified as an expert. Assuming 
the objection valid, it was waived by the appellant 
in opening the inquiry." (Italics ours) 
In Hooper v. Bronson, 266 P. 2d 590 (Cal 1954) the r 
trial court permitted a police officer to express his opinion 
as to the point of impact between a truck and sedan. The 
opinion was elicited on cross examination over the objection 
of plaintiff's counsel. The Appellate Court held that the 
trial court did not commit prejudicial error in allowing the 
police officer to express his opinion as to the point of im-
pact. The court said that when the exact point of impact 
is in dispute, a police officer experienced in investigating 
accidents might express his opinion thereon, basing such 
opinion on the physical facts, such as location of skid marks, 
broken glass and other debris. The court called attention 
to the fact that the officer had previously testified, in ef-
fect, as to the point of impact. 
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It is respectfully submitted that plaintiff should not 
be permitted to complain of testimony elicited on cross 
examination when she opened the subject matter on direct. 
To prohibit cross examination on a subject opened on direct 
is to nullify defendant's right to a fair trial. 
B. POINT OF IMP ACT IS A PROPER SUB-
JECT FOR EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY 
In considering the admissibility of expert opinion tes-
timony, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Webb v. Olin 
Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P. 
2d 1094 (1959): 
"Inherent in the position of the trial judge in 
the immediate control of the trial is the responsi-
bility of passing upon whether the subject justifies 
expert testimony and the qualifications of the wit-
ness as to whether he can give sound and reliable 
help to the jury on it." 
The general rule with regard to the admissibility of 
opinion testimony on point of impact is succinctly stated 
in 20 Am. Jur. Evidence Section 806: 
"* * * Opinions are admissible also as to 
the location of a point where a specific occurrence 
took place * * *" (citing in Supplement Annotation 
at 66 ALR 2d 1048) 
The question of admissibility of opm10n evidence on 
point of impact has been considered by a number of courts 
in recent years. An annotation in 66 ALR 2d 1048 entitled 
"Admissibility of opinion evidence as to point of impact or 
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coll-ision in motor vehicle accident case" presents an ex-
haustive review of the cases dealing with the problem. 
The annotator in his summary concludes that while 
some cases hold that expert evidence as to point of impact 
is not admissible, there is a strong and apparently growing 
authority holding or recognizing that skilled or expert 
opinion evidence is admissible on the point of collision. 
"These courts (holding that expert opinion ev-
idence is admissible on point of import) recognize 
that opinions given by skilled or expert witnesses 
aid the jury, or the court sitting in lieu thereof, in 
drawing correct inferences from the raw and un-
sorted facts, and that such evidence does not usurp 
the province of the jury, since the jury does not 
have to accept the witness' opinions. In addition, 
it may be noted that the cases holding or recognizing 
the admissibility of skilled or expert opinion ev-
idence show that the witness giving the testimony 
had an opportunity to investigate the scene reason-
ably soon after the accident a.nd had sufficient ex-
perience to form a reasonable opinion based upon 
his observations. (Italics ours) 
With regard to the question of admissibility of expert 
opinion testimony on the subject of point of impact it may 
be noted generally that a number of later decisions man.if est 
a more favorable attitude toward the admission of expert 
testimony upon this question. See 66 ALR 2d 1054. The 
Courts reach this conclusion upon the ground that a skilled 
or expert witness can aid the Jury in drawing correct in-
ferences from raw and unsorted facts. 
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In the following cases the Courts held that point of 
impact was a proper subject for expert opinion testimony. 
UTAH 
The annotation in 66 ALR 2d 1048, 1067 lists Utah 
among the States admitting opinion evidence on point of 
impact citing State v. Bleazard, 103 Utah 113, 133 P. 2d 
1000 (1943). Defendant Bleazard was convicted of the 
crime of involuntary manslaughter as the result of an auto-
mobile collision. A highway patrolman who reached the 
scene shortly after the accident, was permitted to identify 
a map prepared by him which gave certain measurements 
and attempted to locate the point of impact. 
On cross examination the patrolman was asked the 
following question by counsel for defendant: 
"In your opinion, is it not possible and probable 
that it was the crash of the Boyington car that 
caused the death of Mrs. Gardiner and not the im-
pact with the Bleazard car?" 
Counsel for the State objected that the question was not the 
subject of opinion evidence. The court sustained the ob-
jection and the defendant assigned it as error. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial 
court stating: 
"It is not the province of a witness to act as 
judge or jury and questions calling for his opinion 
should be so framed as to not call upon him to de-
termine controverted questions of fact or to pass 
upon the preponderance of testimony." 
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The objection was sustained on the ground that the ques-
tion was on causation and invaded the province of the jury. 
There was no contention made that point of impact was 
not a proper subject for expert opinion testimony or that 
it invaded the province of the jury. 
The question of causation, i.e. "what caused the death 
of Mrs. Gardiner", is an entirely different matter from that 
of point of impact i.e. "where was the place on the highway 
where the collision occurred?" 
The opinion clearly states that the highway patrolman 
was permitted to identify a map which attempted to locate 
the point of impact. 1. 
With regard to the question of causation, the courts 
attention is directed to Hooper v. General Motors, 123 Utah 
515, 260 P. 2d 549 (1953) where this court held an expert 
may give an opinion as to the cause of a particular occur-
rence or condition. This Court stated: 
"The modern tendency and the rule of this 
court is that an expert may give an opinion as to 
the cause of a particular occurrence or condition re-
gardless of whether the cause of such occurrence 
or condition is in dispute and regardless of whether 
the jury must determine which of the causes urged 
by the respective parties is the correct one." 
CALIFORNIA 
In People v. Haeussler, 260 P. 2d 8 (Cal. 1953) the 
Supreme Court of California held that a highway patrol-
man with many y~11s experience in investigating accidents 
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and who was upon the scene a few minutes after the ac-
cident could give his opinion as to the point of impact. His 
opinion was based upon an inspection of skid and gouge 
marks on the pavement and the location of oil, broken glass, 
parts of the vehicles and other debris. 
See also Hooper v. Bronson Supr-a (Holding expert 
opinion is admissible as to point of impact) 
IDAHO 
In Grant v. Clark, 305 P. 2d 752 (Idaho 1956) The 
Supreme Court held the trial court properly admitted the 
testimony of a Sheriff wherein he gave his opinion as to 
the probable point of impact. The Court stated : 
"The appellant contends that it was inadmis-
sible as the sheriff was not qualified as an expert. 
The sheriff testified that he had examined a great 
many accidents during his work, which extended 
over two terms, or four years, as sheriff; that in 
his investigations he had tried to determine what had 
happened at the accidents, and particularly to locate 
the points of impact of the automobiles in the var-
ious accidents. The record discloses that this witness 
arrived shortly after the collision. He testified to 
the location of the two automobiles when he arrived, 
and said that he observed the debris on the right-
hand side of the road, on the south edge of the oil, 
when going toward Hammett. He testified that from 
his investigation that in his opinion the point of 
impact was on the south side of the road (Clarke's 
side) near the edge of the oil." 
The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's ruling ad-
mitting the testimony of the Sheriff. 
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ARIZONA 
In Gray v. Woods, 324 P. 2d 220 (Arizona 1958) The 
Supreme Court held that a highway patrolman was proper-
ly allowed to give his opinion on the point of impact. The 
patrolman testified that as a result of his investigation he 
found dirt and debris on the highway and gouge marks in 
the pavement left by one of the wheels of the Studebaker. 
Based upon his previous experience and training and the 
evidence at the scene of the collision, he was permitted to 
give his opinion as to the point of impact. 
The Court stated: 
"It is now generally recognized that a high-
way patrolman or other officer, when shown to have 
proper training and experience in the investigation 
of traffic accidents, testifying as an expert witness, 
may properly give an opinion as to the point of. im. 
pact in a traffic accident where his opinion is based 
on marks on the highway, damage to the vehicles 
involved and the location of debris on the highway 
or other indicia at the scene, but not when such 
opinion is founded on statements made to him by 
other persons. Grant v. Clarke, 78 Idaho 412, 305 P. 
2d 752; Wells Truckways, Ltd. v. Cebrian, 122 Cal. 
App. 2d 666, 265 P. 2d 557; Kalfus v. Fraze, 136 
Cal. App. 2d 415, 288 P. 2d 967; People v. Haeuss-
ler, 41 Cal. 2d 252, 260 P. 2d 8; Nielsen v. Wessels, 
247 Iowa 213, 73 N.W. 2d 83; Tuck v. Buller, Okl., 
311 P. 2d 212." 
COLORADO 
In McNelley v. Smith, 368 P. 2d 555 (Colo. 1962) the 
Supreme Court held that it was competent for a police of-
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ficer to testify as to the point of impact and the angle of 
a collision. These were matters which he determined solely 
from the physical facts existing at the scene of the accident. 
C. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINION 
ON POINT OF IMP ACT RESTS WITHIN DIS-
CRETION OF TRIAL COURT AND ITS RUL-
ING WILL NOT BE REVERSED UNLESS 
DISCRETION HAS BEEN ABUSED 
A number of courts have held that the question of ad-
missibility of expert opinion as to the point of impact in 
a motor vehicle accident case must be left to the common 
sense and discretion of the trial court. 
In the following cases the appellate court held the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert opinion 
testimony. 
UTAH 
The Utah Supreme Court in Webb v. Olin Mathieson 
Chemical Corporation Supra, confronted with the question 
of admissibility of expert opinion testimony, stated that 
the trial court must be allowed a considerable latitude of 
discretion in making such determination. 
"The practical exigencies of the situation make 
it necessary that the trial court be allowed con-
siderable latitude of discretion in making such deter· 
mination. His rulings in that regard should not be 
disturbed lightly, nor at all unless it clearly appears 
that he was in error in his judgment on the matter." 
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Also in Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter Day Saints 
Hospital, 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P. 2d 330 (1957) this court in 
discussing the admissibility of expert opinion testimony 
where the objection was that it went to the "very issue 
before the jury", held the testimony admissible saying: 
"If the opinion evidence is such that it will aid 
the jury in understanding their problems and lead 
them to the truth as to disputed issues of fact, it is 
competent and admissible, irrespective of whether 
it bears directly upon the ultimate fact the jury is 
to determine. And the trial judge is allowed a wide 
discretion in regard to the allowance of such testi-
mony. (Italics ours) 
CALIFORNIA 
In Zelayeta v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 232 P. 2d 572 
(Cal. 1951) the appellate court held the trial court did not 
err in permitting a traffic officer to give his opinion as 
to the point of impact in a collision between a bus and an 
automobile. The court stated it was within the discretion 
of the trial court to admit this opinion evidence. 
WASHINGTON 
In Gerberg v. Crosby 329 P. 2d 184 (Wash. 1958) the 
Supreme Court of Washington, in a well reasoned opinion, 
held that there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion 
in admitting a police officer's opinion as to point of im-
pact based on the physical facts observed after the accident. 
The officer was qualified as an expert in accident in-
vestigation. The Court relates the sequence of his testi-
mony as follows : 
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"When asked whether he had located the Point 
of impact in the acCident between the Crosby car 
and the Gerberg motorcycle, he replied that he had. 
Appellants objected to Hendren's testimony as to 
the location of the point of impact on the ground 
that this was not a proper subject of expert testi-
mony. No objection was made to the qualifications 
of Hendren as an expert. The trial court overruled 
the objection and admitted the evidence. Hendren 
made it clear that he based his opinion solely on 
skid marks made by the motorcycle after the col-
lision." 
The court then discussed the reasons why op1mon testi-
mony should be admitted quoting from Professor Edmund 
M. Morgan in his foreword to the Model Code of Evidence: 
"Judges and lawyers agree with commentators 
that the entire body of law dealing with opinion 
evidence needs radical revision. Mr. Wigmore says 
that the opinion rule 'has done more than any one 
rule of procedure to reduce our litigation towards 
a state of legalized gambling.' The rules evolved in 
this country which prevent a witness from relating 
his relevant experiences in language naturally and 
ordinarily used by laymen, because phrased in terms 
of inferences or conclusions, have invited numberless 
t~ivial appeals and have caused many indefensible 
reversals. They are vague in phrasing and capable 
of capricious application. There is an encouraging 
tendency in some modern trial courts to disregard 
them and in the more progressive appellate courts 
to refuse to interfere with the trial judge's applies· 
tion of them.'' 
The Court quoted from Grismore v. Consolidated 
Products Co., 5 N.W. 2d 646, 655 (Iowa 1942) where the 
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court discussed the place of expert testimony in modern 
trials, saying : 
" * * * It would be difficult to find a subject 
in law in which there has been more judicial con-
fusion and quibbling, both in our own court and in 
those of other jurisdictions. It would also be difficult 
to find a single subject that has been provocative of 
more useless appeals than the matter of expert opin-
ion testimony. In the early days of court procedure 
there was less need of expert opinion testimony. But 
with the complexity of modern life and with the 
amazing growth and advancement of a myriad of 
matters of science, art, mechanics, discovery, in-
vention and industry, which touch our daily life 
constantly on every side, a failure to make the fullest 
use of expert opinions in court procedure means, in 
a great many cases a denial of proof and necessarily 
a denial of justice. For too many years too many 
courts have so frowned upon expert opinion tes-
timony and have so restricted its admission and 
consideration that the triers of facts have been de-
nied aid that was essential to a proper determina-
tion of litigated causes." 
The court concluded by stating that in the field of 
expert testimony much must be left to the common sense 
and discretion of the trial court. The court found no 
abuse of discretion in the admission of the officer's testi-
mony. 
OKLAHOMA 
In Tuck v. Buller, 311 P. 2d 212, 66 ALR 2d 1043 
(Okla. 1957) the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting a highway 
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patrolman to state his opinion as to the point of impact. 
The court stated that a wide latitude of discretion is given 
the trial court in the determination of the admission of ex-
pert testimony. The court relied upon the California case 
of Kalfus v. Fraze, 288 P. 2d 967 (Cal. 1955) wherein it 
was held that a police officer with proper training and 
experience in investigation of traffic accidents could give 
expert testimony as to the point of impact when his opinion 
derived from examination of physical evidence or indicia 
at the scene. 
The court held: 
"The contention of defendant relative to the 
alleged error in admitting expert testimony as to 
point of impact being substantially the same as in 
the Kalfus case, supra, and being without control-
ling precedent in our own state, we adhere to the 
rule and reasoning enunciated therein, and apply 
the same to this case, and hold that the highway 
patrolman, who was qualified by training and ex-
perience in the investigation of traffic accidents 
and submission of reports on facts and causes of 
such accidents, may give expert testimony as to the 
point of impact when, as in this case, his opinion 
derives from examination of physical evidence or 
indicia at the scene of the accident." 
The trial judge must consider all the circumstances 
under which the expert opinion is offered, including the 
qualifications of the expert, the subject of his opinion, the 
foundation for his opinion and whether or not it invades 
the province of the jury. When the trial judge has ad-
mitted such testimony, his decision should not be over-
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turned unless there is a clear showing that he has abused 
his discretion. 
It is earnestly submitted that the trial judge in this 
case did not abuse his discretion but properly permitted 
the highway patrolman to testify on the point of impact. 
D. THE OPINION OF PATROLMAN SHER-
WOOD WAS BASED UPON AN INVESTIGA-
TION OF THE ACCIDENT SCENE. 
Plaintiff contends in her brief (page 23) that the 
opinion of Patrolman Sherwood was based upon some 
source other than the competent facts. Plaintiff called 
Sherwood as her own witness. (R. 174) Plaintiff admits 
in her brief that she vouched for the patrolman's credi-
bility when she put him on the witness stand. (Plaintiff's 
brief page 9) . Plaintiff admitted the patrolman was 
qualified to testify as to the point of impact by asking him 
on direct examination if there were "objective signs'' to 
determine the point of collision. (R 181) There were no 
questions about the patrolman's qualifications as an ex-
pert. He had been investigating accidents for 24 years. 
(R 17 4) The record unequivocally shows that the patrol-
man's testimony on the point of impact was based on his 
personal observations at the accident scene. 
He was on the highway investigating a prior accident 
when the impact between the Robert's truck and defend-
ant's vehicle occurred. (R 174) The noise of the impact 
caused Sherwood to turn around in less than a second. (R 
180) 
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Q. (Mr. Beesley) What was the first thing 
that occurred that drew your attention that an ac. 
cident had happened? 
A. The noise of the impact being so close to 
me. 
Q. All right. Would you describe the sequence 
of events after you heard the noise? 
A. The noise was more to my rear and to my 
right, so I just turned to the right and saw this 
Davies vehicle taking off down the pavement on 
the right or east side of the highway and it travelled 
some distance, and then it turned sideways and 
skidded and then rolled one complete turn. (R 177, 
178) 
The patrolman was an eye witness to the course travel-
led by the Roberts truck immediately after impact and its 
roll over 310 feet down the highway. (R 177) Sherwood 
testified to the skid marks laid down by the Robert's truck 
after the impact and drew them on the blackboard. (R 179) 
He measured the distance from the point where the two 
vehicles came together to where they finally came to rest, 
the Roberts truck going on north 310 feet and the defend-
ant's vehicle going south 150 feet. (R 178) 
Sherwood testified that he examined both the Robert's 
truck and the defendant's vehicle and he described the 
damage to both vehicles. (R 185) He further testified 
that he examined the highway where the two vehicles 
collided, that there was debris on the highway and that 
he made a determination as to the approximate point of 
25 
impact. (R 182) Sherwood testified to these facts from his 
own personal observations. 
There is not one scintilla of evidence in this case to 
support plaintiff's contention that patrolman Sherwood 
based his opinion on statements made by others. 
The Court and the jury were made aware of the facts 
upon which Sherwood based his opinion. The question of 
the weight to be given his opinion was clearly a matter for 
the jury. 20 Am. Jur. 671, Evidence, Section 798: 
"The admissibility of expert testimony is a 
question for the court, while its weight is a matter 
properly evaluated by the jury." 
E. ALLOWING THE PATROLMAN TO TESTI-
FY ON THE POINT OF IMP ACT DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Plaintiff claims in her brief (page 30) that the court 
refused to permit Sheriff Jackson to give his "opinion" 
(R 156) but permitted patrolman Sherwood to give his 
"judgment" (R 184) as to the point of impact. 
The record conclusively shows that plaintiff Jackson 
could not determine the point of collision between the 
Roberts truck and defendant's vehicle. 
Q. (Mr. Beesley) Were you able to determine 
the point of collision that these cars had? 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
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A. There was no marks on the highway other 
than the debris which covered a large area. Now, 
this debris was glass and dirt, and there was no 
point that I-we could determine or I could deter. 
mine where the point of impact were and where 
one car was in relationship to the other car. The 
first marks laid down by any vehicle was the Ro-
berts car after it left the scene, and if you don't 
mind, I will show you where they started. (R 145) 
On redirect examination plaintiff's attorney was ask-
ing Sheriff Jackson about the "marks" on the highway 
running from the Roberts vehicle when the Sheriff volun-
teered his "opinion." He obviously was not going to 
volunteer an opinion on the point of impact when he had 
previously testified he could not determine where it was. 
An examination of the record discloses that the Sheriff 
was not asked for his opinion as to point of impact nor 
was he volunteering an opinion as to point of impact, but 
that it was his opinion from the marks that there had been 
a sideward skid of the (Roberts) automobile. 
Q. (Mr. Beesley) All right. Now, I believe 
you indicated that there were marks on the high-
way running from the Roberts vehicle. 
A. That's right. 
Q. And all of these marks were on the east 
side of the highway? 
A. That's right. This vehicle-from the marks 
I would be of the opinion that the vehicle--
MR. NEBEKER: I object, Your Honor, to any 
opinion given by the officer. 
2'1 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. NEBEKER: I think he ought to confine 
himself to what he saw. 
THE COURT: Just tell what you saw. 
MR. BEESLEY: Certainly. 
A. I saw the marks leading directly from the 
Roberts car back along the highway to the south 
for quite some distance, and they were quite wide 
apart, wider than would be made by the normal, 
oh, skidding of a car going down the highway 
straight, and then they ceased. All these marks were 
on the east side of the highway. 
Q. And were these four tire marks, or were 
they just two? 
A. Well, I think they were just two, say skid-
ding and sluffing,affair. (R 155, 156) 
On recross examination Jackson was asked if it did ap-
pear from the tire marks that there had been a sideward 
skid of the automobile (Roberts truck). 
Q. (Mr. Nebeker) Sheriff Jackson, did it ap-
pear from these tire marks that there had been a 
sideward skid of this automobile? 
A. It was definitely sideward. 
Q. And you have indicated on the board that 
those skid marks angle obliquely across the east 
half of the highway. Is that correct? 
A. That's correct. (R 156) 
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It is obvious that Sheriff Jackson was going to volun. 
teer his opinion that the Robert's truck skidded sidewards 
down the highway after the impact with the defendant's 
vehicle. Plaintiff's attempt to infer that the Sheriff was 
prevented from giving his "opinion" as to the point of im. 
pact is completely unfounded. 
This court has previously recognized the importance of 
safeguarding the right of trial by jury. This court has stated 
that in order to give substance to that right, once the trial 
has been had and a verdict rendered, it should not be re-
garded lightly, nor overturned because of errors or irregu-
larities unless they are of sufficient consequence to have 
affected the result. See Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 
360 P. 2d 822 (1961); Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co., _ 
Utah 2d _, 397 P. 2d 990 (Utah 1964). 
In weighing the testimony of patrolman Sherwood in 
the overall picture of this trial it is important to recognize 
that there was a conflict in the testimony as to the point 
of impact. Several witnesses testified to what they had 
observed at the scene of the accident. The jury had all 
this evidence before it. 
In Zelayeta v. Pacific Greyhound Lines Supra, under 
very similar facts, the Court stated: 
"Apppellants argue the question of the admissi-
bility of Edward's (police officer) opinion as if it 
were the most vital evidence in the case. They great-
ly overemphasize and exaggerate its importan~e. 
Edwards had testified, as did several other wit· 
nesses, as to what he observed at the scene of the 
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accident. On direct examination he gave the reasons 
upon which his opinion was predicated. Eye wit-
nesses testified as to the point of impact. Two other 
officers, at least equally competent, gave contrary 
opinions based upon the same facts. The jury had 
all this evidence before it. Under these circum-
stances, assuming that it was error to permit Ed. 
wards to give his opinion as to the point of impact, 
such error could not have been prejudicial. The 
transcript in this case covers some 1620 pages. A 
great deal of this record is devoted to the issue of 
where and how the collision occurred. The case was 
hotly contested and well tried on both sides. During 
such a trial it would be a rare occurrence indeed if 
some error in the admission or exclusion of evidence 
did not occur. * * * After reading this record we 
are convinced that Edwards' testimony, whether 
rightfully or wrongfully admitted, played a very 
minor part in the ultimate determination of the 
case. (Italics ours) 
This court in Hales v. Peterson Supra recognized the 
necessity of viewing the overall picture of the trial to see 
if the parties have been afforded an opportunity to fully 
and fairly present their evidence and argument upon the 
issues. If the jury has made its determination the objec-
tive of the proceeding has been accomplished. The court 
said: 
"Anyone acquainted with the practical opera-
tion of a trial by jury and the human factors that 
must play a part therein is aware that it would be 
almost impossible to complete a trial of any length 
without some things occurring with which counsel, 
after the case is lost, can find fault and, in zeal for 
his cause, all quite in good faith, magnify into error 
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which to him and the losing parties seems blameable 
for their failure to.prevail. However, from the stand. 
point of administering evenhanded justice the court 
must dispassionately survey such claims against the 
overall picture of the trial, and if the parties have 
been afforded an opportunity to fully and fairly 
present their evidence and arguments upon the 
issues, and the jury has made its determination 
thereon, the objective of the proceeding has been 
accomplished. And the judgment should not be dis-
turbed unless it is shown that there is error which 
is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that it 
appears that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the result would have been different in the absence 
of such error, which we have concluded does not 
exist here." 
The court in its instruction No. 6 (R 48) advised the 
Jury: 
--
"* * * The testimony of each witness should be 
considered fairly and impartially and be given such 
weight and effect as you think it is entitled to, 
measured by reason and common sense and the 
standards given you in these instructions for de-
termining the weight and credibility of witnesses 
generally." 
In instruction No. 7 (R 49) the court gave the 
standard instruction relating to the weight and credibility 
of a witness. 
"In judging the weight and credibility of an_Y 
witness, you should keep in mind the bias, if ~ny is 
shown, of such witness; his interest, if any, m the 
result of the trial; and any probable motive or lac~ 
thereof to testify as he does. You may consider bis 
e 
[. 
t 
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appearance on the witness stand, the reasonableness 
or lack thereof of his statements, his apparent 
frankness and candor or the want of it, his oppor-
tunity to know, his ability to understand, his capac-
ity to remember, together with all of the facts and 
circumstances which have a bearing on the accuracy 
of his statements. You should also consider any con-
tradictory evidence and whether or not he contra-
dicted himself, and from all the facts and circum-
stances given in evidence determine what weight 
and credibility you should give to the testimony of 
any witness." 
These instructions properly advised the jury of their duty 
to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. It must be pre-
sumed that the jury followed the instructions and gave 
what weight they thought appropriate to the testimony of 
each witness. 
Patrolman Sherwood's opinion was proper and did not 
constitute prejudicial error when viewed in the overall 
picture of this trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The admission or exclusion of evidence must of neces-
sity be left to the sound discretion of the trial court. On 
cross examination the trial court permitted the patrolman 
to express his opinion as to the point of impact after the 
subject had been opened on direct. There was no abuse 
of discretion in admitting such testimony. 
The plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to fully 
and fairly present her evidence and argument upon the 
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issues involved in this .case. The jury, after extensive 
deliberation made its determination. Based on the jury's 
answers to the special verdict, the trial court entered 
judgment of no cause of action. 
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
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